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ABSTRACT
Lower federal courts often fail to provide plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases
the relief intended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and mandated by
the Supreme Court when it recognized the cause of action twenty years ago.
There is little doubt that sexual harassment in the workplace persists. However,
lower courts misapply or ignore Supreme Court reasoning that would result in
fairer and more consistent dispositions in hostile work environment sexual
harassment cases. This article draws directly on reasoning from the Supreme
Court cases to explain the sources of the confusion in the lower courts and offers
jury instructions and guidelines to judges that reflect what the Supreme Court
intended.

A female deputy sheriff alleged that, in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, she was sexually harassed by another officer in the County
1
Sheriff’s Department where they worked. The co-worker’s harassing behavior
included, among other acts, his comment to the deputy that “you can just walk
into the room and I get an erection;” his calling the deputy a “frigid bitch” on
two occasions, once when he tried to kiss her after a department Christmas
party, and another time when she refused to join him in a hot tub at a hotel
where they both were attending a conference; his telling her that “her ass sure
does look fine;” and his descriptions to her and others of a golf tournament
where the caddies were strippers and they were directed “to place golf balls into
2
their vaginas and to squirt them onto the green.”
The federal district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
In 2006, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s
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1. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Id. at 914 n.3.
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decision, stating that the conduct was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
3
constitute actionable sexual harassment.
INTRODUCTION
This brief description of a 2006 disposition represents one of many
decisions in which courts have unreasonably ruled that plaintiffs could not
establish the existence of a hostile work environment caused by sexual
4
harassment.
There are numerous examples of cases in which summary
judgments for defendants have been improperly granted or verdicts for
5
plaintiffs have been vacated. There is widespread agreement by scholars that
even twenty years after the recognition by the Supreme Court of the cause of
action for hostile work environment sexual harassment, there is a failure to
6
provide the relief intended under Title VII and mandated by the Court.
“Sexual harassment in American worklife is [common-place] – [affecting]
as [many] as 80 percent of women in certain sectors, according to one study. But
7
most women don’t stand a chance of winning a lawsuit.” There seems little
doubt that sexual harassment in the workplace persists and has measurable and
3. Id. at 914−15.
4. In Part III, three particularly illustrative cases are discussed in depth.
5. See generally Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases,
34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71 (1999); M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 311 (1999); Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab,
The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 548 (2001) (examining every federal district
and appellate court decision involving workplace sexual harassment from 1986−95, determining
which plaintiffs were more likely to be successful).
6. See generally DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B.
Siegel eds., 2004); Vicki Schultz, Understanding Sexual Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What
Can We Do About It, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1 (2006); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L. J. 1683 (2003); Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The Gap Between What
Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 791 (2002); Eric Schnapper,
Some of Them Still Don’t Get It: Hostile Work Environment Litigation in the Lower Courts, 1999 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 277 (1999); Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment to be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of Employment, 62
MD. L. REV. 85 (2003); Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 1169 (1998); Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright-Line Test Consistent
with the First Amendment, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591 (2004).
7. BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2006, at G1 (the word “pervasive” was replaced in the text with
“common-place” in order to minimize confusion in the discussion of the legal standard of
“pervasive”). This is just one of many accounts of ongoing or increasing incidents of sexual
harassment in the workplace. See, e.g., Yvonne Abraham, Unappetizing Behavior, BOSTON GLOBE, July
29, 2007, at B1 (describing a complaint filed with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination by an experienced woman bartender who was fired after complaining that her
manager frequently propositioned women at the bar, commented on his sexual needs and practices,
and regularly displayed explicit signs and sex toys on her bar, including a mechanical toy that
simulated intercourse; this restaurant was managed by a company which three years before initially
did not respond but eventually settled a claim against a manager in another restaurant who was
charged by four waitresses with, among other things, rubbing up against them, regaling them with
detailed reviews of pornographic films, and focusing the restaurant’s hidden camera on customers’
breasts); Liz Kowalczyk, Woman Details Case Against Haddad, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2007, at B1
(reporting on the filing of a complaint against the Caritas hospital chain alleging sexual harassment
against it and a former chief executive; the former employee stated that the executive had frequently
kissed and embraced her over a 15−month period).
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immeasurable impacts on those who are victimized by this form of
8
discrimination and on their employers.
In 1986, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized a cause of
action for workers subjected to a hostile work environment created by sexual
9
harassment. It held that such conduct, when objectively severe or pervasive,
10
violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, since then, lower
courts have not consistently or rationally applied this standard. This is not the
result of a failure of the Supreme Court to establish a workable and fair
standard, nor is it due to an absence of scholarly or judicial analysis of those
standards. Nevertheless, troubling and confusing precedent is created and
followed because too often Supreme Court cases are relied on for only the
narrowest propositions. Lower courts ignore or dismiss the Supreme Court’s
reasoning which would provide the necessary guidance to determine whether
11
harassment is severe or pervasive.
To address the problem of unreasonable and unfair dispositions denying
plaintiffs relief, some commentators have suggested solutions requiring a
change in the law, through legislation, manipulation or abandonment of
12
Supreme Court standards, or use of social science to determine violations of the

8. See, e.g., THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTH VERSUS WORKING REALITIES 1 (2005).
9. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65−67 (1986).
10. Id. at 67; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2003).
11. See BEINER, supra note 8, at 20. Popular media also has addressed the problem of confusing
application of standards for determining the existence of unlawful sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Sacha Pfeiffer, Gray Areas Complicate Sexual Harassment Cases, BOSTON GLOBE, May 25, 2006, at A1
(“Although most companies have detailed and similar policies against sexual harassment, employers
often find themselves in murky territory when it comes to defining, proving, and disciplining sexual
harassment in the workplace.” Among the complications noted in the article are the need for caseby-case evaluation of highly fact-specific charges, often turning on determinations of credibility; the
differing perceptions of the alleged perpetrator and complainant; and workplace circumstances,
environment, and culture.).
12. See, e.g., e. christi cunningham, Preserving Normal Heterosexual Male Fantasy: The “Severe or
Pervasive” Missed-Interpretation of Sexual Harassment in the Absence of a Tangible Job Consequence, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 199, 270−72 (1999) (arguing that the severe or pervasive standard is an extension of
sexual inequality and a new standard should be implemented); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harassment
as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375, 394−99
(1998) (describing that sexual harassment analysis is too vague and advocating a tort law approach);
Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in Responding to Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment – A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1517, 1533−38, 1594−95
(1999) (suggesting that the totality of circumstances test should be dropped and internal arbitration
policies instituted to prevent and respond to sexual harassment). Some have proposed substituting
the reasonable person standard with a reasonable woman standard. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kerns, A
Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another Chance, 10
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195, 196−97, 208−09 (2001); Barbara A. Gutek, et al., The Utility of the
Reasonable Woman Legal Standard in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Cases: a Multi-Method,
Multi-Standard Examination, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 596, 625−26 (1999) ; Nicole Newman, The
Reasonable Woman: Has She Made a Difference? 27 B. C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 529, 541−42, 555 (2007) (book
review). Another proposal suggests that the severe or pervasive standard should be applied as an
inverse variance test. See, e.g., Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A
Consideration of Post-Vinson Approaches Designed to Determine Whether Sexual Harassment is Sufficiently
Severe or Pervasive, 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 215, 226 (1993) There has also been the suggestion that a
traditional disparate impact analysis should be included within the consideration of whether the
conduct was severe or pervasive. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 6, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. at 48−50;
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14

law. However, the inability of plaintiffs to win lawsuits is not the result of
unreasonable legal standards set forth by the Supreme Court; rather, it is the
result of a failure to apply those standards. Lower courts have ignored the
direction and guidance of the Supreme Court cases which explained the cause of
action and detailed how facts are to be evaluated in ruling on claims of hostile
work environment sexual harassment. The solution is simple: courts need to
apply the Supreme Court cases more consistently, providing a fair and workable
approach to the standards for determining whether alleged conduct in sexual
harassment cases violates Title VII.
Part I of this article explores the development of the standards for the
establishment of a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment,
particularly the requirement that the conduct be severe or pervasive. Part II
identifies several reasons for the confusing and inconsistent application of this
severe or pervasive standard. Part III examines three recently litigated cases to
demonstrate how greater reliance on Supreme Court analysis would have
resulted in fairer and more reasonable dispositions. Part IV provides a clear and
precise approach to the severe or pervasive standard based on an analysis
synthesizing the reasoning of the Supreme Court. We suggest the use of this
approach as model jury instructions or as guidance for judges when considering
motions for summary judgment. The proposed analysis should be applied in
evaluating facts and making case analogies, so that more consistent and rational
outcomes can be obtained in sexual harassment hostile work environment cases.
This article’s goal is to offer courts and litigators a practical solution to the
challenge of interpreting and applying the rather abstract standards of severe or
15
pervasive.
Our analysis would more successfully differentiate “ordinary
16
socializing in the workplace” from “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
17
insult.”

Schultz, supra note 6, 107 YALE L. J. at 1714−16, 1799−1801; Jamie Lynn Cook, Comment, Bitch v.
Whore: the Current Trend to Define the Requirements of an Actionable Hostile Environment Claim in Verbal
Sexual Harassment Cases, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 465, 492− 94 (2000); Laura D. Francis, Note, What
Part of “Hostile Environment” Don’t You Understand? The Need for an Entire-Environment Approach in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 815, 824−29 (2004).
13. BEINER, supra note 8, at 29−45.
14. See generally BEINER, supra note 5.
15. See Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N. Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (reporting on a presentation at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in
which seven judges of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed the decline in reliance
on law review articles due in part to the failure of such articles to address actual statutes, cases and
doctrines (Judge Jacobs is quoted as saying “I haven’t opened a law review in years. . . .No one
speaks of them. No one relies on them.” And, to the extent law reviews are cited, Judge Stack stated
that they are used “more for support than for illumination.”)); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Law Reviews
vs. the Courts: Two Thoughts from the Ivory Tower, 39 CONN. L. REV. CONNtemplations 1, 2 (Spring
2007) (supporting the suggestion that at least some legal scholarship should aspire to be useful to
judges).
16. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
17. Id. at 78.
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PART I
18

In its decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, in 1986, the Supreme
19
Court held that Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] , which prohibits, inter
alia, discrimination based on sex, encompasses a cause of action for sexual
20
harassment resulting in the creation of a hostile or abusive work environment.
The statute does not prohibit sexual harassment; rather, it prohibits
discrimination “against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
21
conditions or privileges of employment. . .”
The Court stated that sexual
harassment is prohibited by Title VII, noting that the statute evinced “a
congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of
22
men and women’ in employment.” The Court quoted from Guidelines issued
23
in 1980 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which specified
24
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title VII.
The Court also stated that the EEOC Guidelines drew on a substantial body of
lower court opinions which had already ruled that Title VII encompasses claims
of a hostile environment based on sexual harassment, just as it recognizes such
25
claims based on racial harassment.
However, the Court stated that “not all workplace conduct that may be
described as ‘harassment’ affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment
26
within the meaning of Title VII.” The Court then declared that “[f]or sexual
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter
the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
27
environment.’”

18. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer –
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”)
20. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65−66 (distinguishing hostile environment sexual harassment from a
cause of action based on quid pro quo discrimination, which conditions concrete employment benefits
on sexual favors, and also holding that a plaintiff in a hostile work environment claim need not
establish economic or tangible harm in order to prevail).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
22. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707, n.13 (1978)).
23. Id. at 65. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is charged under Title VII with
the responsibility for the administration of the Act and a variety of duties associated with its
implementation. See 42 U.S.C. A. § 2000e-4.
24. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. The Guidelines enumerate certain types of workplace conduct which
might be actionable: “Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature[.]” 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985).
25. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66−67; See Johnson, supra note 6, at 122 (noting that the severe or
pervasive standard is applied in racial harassment cases less stringently than in sexual harassment
cases). See generally Robert J. Gregory, You Can Call Me a “Bitch” – Just Don’t Use the “N-Word”: Some
Thoughts on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations and Rodgers v. Western Southern Life
Insurance Co., 46 DE PAUL L. REV. 741 (Spring 1997).
26. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
27. Id. (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 904 (8th Cir. 1982)).
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After concluding that the conduct in Meritor was not only pervasive, but
“criminal conduct of the most serious nature,” and therefore “plainly sufficient
28
to state a claim for ‘hostile environment’ sexual harassment”, the Court
provided somewhat limited additional guidance about how courts should
29
determine if conduct was severe or pervasive. Again relying on the EEOC
Guidelines, the Court declared that “the trier of fact must determine the
existence of sexual harassment in light of the ‘record as a whole’ and ‘the totality
of circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
30
which the alleged incidents occurred.’” The Court stated that “‘mere utterance
of an . . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee’ would not
31
affect the conditions of employment to a significant degree to violate Title VII.”
32
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the Court again
considered this cause of action. The Court affirmed the standard in Meritor,
stating: “When the workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult’ . . . (internal citation omitted). . . that is ‘sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an
abusive working environment’, . . . (internal citation omitted). . . Title VII is
33
violated.” In Harris, the Court resolved a conflict among the circuits concerning
the necessity for proving psychological harm or actual injury, declaring that it
was taking a “middle path between making actionable any conduct that is
merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological
34
injury.”
It then refined the standard for establishing a hostile work
environment, holding that conduct must be considered both objectively hostile or
abusive (if a reasonable person would find it so) and subjectively abusive (as
experienced by the victim) to prove that the conduct actually altered the
35
conditions of the victim’s employment.
The Court then stated that the objective test is not and cannot be
mathematically precise, and affirmed that the totality of circumstances must be

28. Id. at 60. The Court stated that respondent testified that the bank manager: forcibly raped
her on several occasions, had sexual intercourse with her 40 to 50 times, and fondled her; made
verbal sexual advances towards her, including invitations for sexual relations and demands for
sexual favors; and followed her into the restroom when she went there alone, and exposed himself
to her.
29. Id. at 68 (noting that the “gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is that the alleged
sexual advances were ‘unwelcome’” (citing 29 CFR § 1604.11(a) (1985) and distinguishing this from
the question of whether the victim’s actual participation was voluntary). And see Theresa M. Beiner,
Sexy Dressing Revisited: Does Target Dress Play a Part in Sexual Harassment Cases, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L
& POL’Y 125, 135−38 (2007) (considering the role of women’s attire in determining whether the
conduct is considered unwelcome).
30. Id. at 69 (quoting 29 CFR § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
31. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238, in which the court discussed “an ethnic or racial
epithet.”).
32. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
33. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65).
34. Id.
35. Id. As noted, the focus of this article is on the objective test requirement that the conduct be
severe or pervasive; therefore, discussion of the standard for satisfying the subjective test is not
discussed.
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36

The Court declared: “These [circumstances] may include the
considered.
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
37
unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” The Court
38
held that “no single factor is required.”
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Harris was prescient. He was concerned that
39
the Court did not create a clear standard. He commented that although the
Court listed some factors that contribute to abusiveness, “since it neither says
how much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single
40
factor as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude.” “As a practical matter,
today’s holding lets virtually unguided juries decide whether sex-related
conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an employer is egregious enough to
warrant an award of damages. . . . Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to
41
the course the Court has taken. . . .
It would not be until 1998 that the Court again addressed the standards to
be applied to a sexual harassment claim under Title VII. In Oncale v Sundowner
42
Offshore Services, Inc., the Court held that there may be a violation of Title VII’s
prohibition against discrimination because of sex when the harasser and the
43
victim are of the same sex. The Court affirmed its earlier ruling that in order to
establish a violation of Title VII, the conduct must be objectively severe or
44
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment.
The Court, in the opinion authored by Justice Scalia, then provided analysis
directed at the determination of whether conduct could be considered severe,
expanding on the explanation in Harris of what is to be considered when
45
objectively viewing the totality of circumstances. The determination should
include careful consideration of the social context in which the behavior occurs,

36. Id. at 22–23.
37. Id. at 23.
38. 510 U.S. at 23. The Court relied in its ruling on facts found by the Magistrate, noting that
the company president often insulted the employee because of her gender and often made her the
target of unwanted sexual innuendos; occasionally asked her and other employees to get coins from
his front pocket; and threw objects on the ground in front of her and other women and asked them
to pick them up. Id. at 19−20. The Court stated that the district court had adopted the Magistrate’s
report and recommendations and found that this was a “close case.” Id. at 20.
39. See id. at 24.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 24−25. Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence stated that “[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s
text indicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.” Id. at 25.
42. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
43. Id. at 77, 79.
44. Id. at 78 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). In advocating this
interpretation of Title VII to include same-sex harassment, Justice Scalia noted that “. . .statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which
we are governed.” Id. at 79.
45. See id. at 81 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). In Oncale, Justice Scalia seems to be responding to
his concern about the vagueness of the standard which he expressed in Harris.
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[because] the real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of words used or the
physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to
social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple
teasing or roughhousing . . . and conduct which a reasonable person in the
46
plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.

Also significant in Oncale are the specific references to conduct which could
47
and could not be considered severe. Explicit or implicit proposals of sexual
activity could be considered severe; conduct which could be considered severe
need not be motivated by sexual desire, but instead could be motivated by
general hostility toward the presence of the victim in the workplace based on
48
gender. Conduct will not be considered severe “merely because the words
49
used have sexual content or connotations.” The Court affirmed that requiring
the conduct to be objectively severe or pervasive would “ensure that courts and
juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace - such as . . .
50
intersexual flirtation - for discriminatory ‘conditions of employment.’” Justice
Scalia explicitly warned against expanding Title VII into “a general civility
51
code.”
[T]he statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite
sex. The prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither
asexuality nor androgyny in the workplace; it forbids only behavior so
52
objectively offensive as to alter the “conditions” of the victim’s employment.
53

54

In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
both decided in 1998, the Court focused on how courts should determine when

46. Id. at 81−82. See generally Rebecca K. Lee, Pink, White, and Blue: Class Assumptions in the
Judicial Interpretations of Title VII Hostile Environment Sex Harassment, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 677 (2005)
(discussing class assumptions in examining the social context effecting a determination of what is
offensive conduct, but noting that vulgarity is common within white collar environments); see also
Melissa R. Null, Note, Disrespectful, Offensive, Boorish & Decidedly Immature Behavior is Not Sufficient to
Meet the Requirement of Title VII: Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 69 MO. L. REV. 255, 271−73 (2004)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court did not adequately clarify the social context factor under the
totality of circumstances test, resulting in different applications of severe or pervasive based on the
economic status of the worker); Duncan, infra Part III.
47. 532 U.S. at 78−80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25). The Oncale opinion provides no guidance
about what might constitute pervasive conduct.
48. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 81.
51. Id. But see Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment, in MACKINNON &
SIEGEL, supra note 6, at 176. “. . .Oncale’s admonition that Title VII does not impose a civility code on
the workplace has had the effect of kicking open the door to a new ‘horseplay defense’ to sexual
harassment claims”; the author lists conduct that has been dismissed as “mere” teasing and
horseplay as improperly being characterized as within the genuine but innocuous differences in the
way men and women interact.
52. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
53. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
54. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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employers are liable for workplace harassment in violation of Title VII based on
55
acts of supervisors and subordinates.
In Faragher, the Court reiterated its
56
commitment to the contours of this cause of action set forth in its precedent,
describing these standards as “sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII
57
does not become a ‘general civility code.’” The Court also offered additional
guidance about conduct which could and could not be considered severe: the
58
conduct must be extreme to alter the terms and conditions of employment;
“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely
serious) will not amount to [such] changes in the terms and conditions of
59
employment”; proper application of the standards “will filter out complaints
attacking ‘the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of
60
abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’”
Thus, in this way, between 1986 and 1998, the Supreme Court set out the
cause of action for hostile work environment sexual harassment and developed
standards for its adjudication.
PART II
We do not transform Title VII into a workplace “civility code,” [citation omitted]
when we condemn conduct less severe than that which shocks our conscience.
And when we raise the bar . . .[so]. . . high . . .[,] it becomes more likely that we
will miss the more subtle forms of sex discrimination that may still infest the

55. “We hold that an employer is vicariously liable for actionable discrimination caused by a
supervisor, but subject to an affirmative defense looking to the reasonableness of the employer’s
conduct as well as that of a plaintiff victim.” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780; and see Burlington, 524 U.S. at
746−47, 754−55.
56. See 524 U.S. at 786−88.
57. Id. at 788 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80).
58. See id.
59. Id. (omitting quotation marks indicating reliance on Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82).
60. Id. (quoting B. LINDEMANN & D. KADUE, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAW, 175
(1992)). The Court revisited the standard for establishing a violation of Title VII based on the
creation of a hostile work environment in Clark Co. School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) and
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). The Court in Clark, relying explicitly on
its prior rulings, reiterated that conduct must be severe or pervasive, and that this is determined by
looking at all the circumstances, including the Harris factors; the Court restated “that simple teasing,
offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) [would] not . . . [constitute]
changes in the ‘terms or conditions of employment.’” 532 U.S. at 271. It concluded that the single
incident in the record was “at worst an ‘isolated incident’ that cannot remotely be considered
‘extremely serious’ as our cases require,” and therefore, could not have been considered by a
reasonable person to have violated Title VII. See id. 270−71 (citations omitted).
In a claim of a racially hostile work environment, the Court in Morgan, without explicitly
undermining its suggestion in Clark that a single extremely serious incident could create a hostile
work environment, recognized that “[h]ostile environment claims are different in kind from discrete
acts. Their very nature involves repeated conduct.” 536 U.S. at 115 (citation omitted). Therefore, the
challenged conduct “occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete
acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own. . . . Such claims are based on the
cumulative affect of individual acts.” Id. (citations omitted).
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workplace, and make it more difficult for women, especially, to participate on
61
terms of equality with their male counterparts.

Perhaps the major reason for the landscape of confusing and inconsistent
outcomes in cases involving sexual harassment hostile work environment claims
is the failure of courts to follow the standards articulated by the Supreme Court
to determine whether conduct is severe or pervasive. Courts have unnecessarily
struggled to define when there is liability because conduct was severe –
somewhere on the spectrum between innocuous flirtation and assault – or
because the conduct was pervasive – somewhere on the spectrum between
62
isolated and constant. The needless discomfort with how to evaluate conduct
has also led to an unjustified number of summary dispositions for defendants
63
and vacated jury determinations for plaintiffs.
The difficulty courts have in applying the severe or pervasive standard has
been to some degree due to confusion about the reasoning and the significance
of the Supreme Court cases. The reasons behind the analytical errors committed
by lower courts are explored in this section.
A. Narrow application of Supreme Court precedent.
Too often Supreme Court cases are relied on for only the narrowest of
rulings. Meritor is primarily recognized for establishing the cause of action for
hostile work environment, requiring that the conduct be severe or pervasive
based on the totality of circumstances, and holding that the victim need not have
64
endured economic harm. The Harris case is most cited for the proposition that
there need not be psychological harm to establish the creation of a hostile work
environment, and that plaintiff must satisfy both a subjective and an objective

61. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999) (Tjoflat, J. concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
62. See RAYMOND F. GREGORY, UNWELCOME AND UNLAWFUL: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 58−59 (2004).
63. See, e.g., authorities cited, supra note 5; Beiner, supra note 6; Schnapper, supra note 6, at
294−307 (discussing the appropriate role for juries in sexual harassment hostile work environment
cases), 344 (“The appropriate response of the legal system to less severe forms of harassment should
be the same response to less severe physical assaults – lower damages. Judicial efforts to delineate a
safe harbor for lower level harassment seek to impose an all-or-nothing rule to cases involving
differences in degree; damages, on the other hand, can be calibrated to take into account just those
types of differences.”) Contributing to the analytical uncertainty is the fact that even in 2008, many
judges assigned to these cases, in both district and appellate courts, have an aversion to such cases,
perhaps because of their gender and/or life experiences. See BEINER, supra note 8, at 30 (noting that
the demographics of the federal judiciary suggest leaving this fact-specific inquiry to juries because
the severe or pervasive standard depends on community standards which are best imposed by a
jury, rather than a judge); Gregory, supra note 25, at 775−76 (addressing judicial discomfort with
sexual harassment cases as opposed to racial harassment cases); Schnapper, supra note 6, at 325
(noting that evaluation of conduct to determine if it was severe or pervasive is complex and fact
specific, ordinarily appropriate for a jury). In a genuine effort to try to heed the warning of the
Supreme Court, trial judges have wanted to avoid turning Title VII into a “general civility code;”
perhaps this has made them more inclined to view the complained-of conduct as petty or trivial, i.e.,
the vicissitudes of the workplace with which workers should cope.
64. See 477 U.S. at 67−68.
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test. In addition, the Harris factors often are cited. Oncale is most frequently
67
thought of as the case which recognized a claim for same-sex harassment.
68
Faragher is relied on when determining employer liability. However, these
cases provide explicit guidance as to what constitutes objectively severe or
pervasive harassment, and when courts limit the application of these Supreme
Court decisions to such narrow holdings, it results in inconsistent and irrational
decisions.
B. Failure to differentiate the subjective and objective tests.
Harris and subsequent Supreme Court cases require that in order to prevail
the plaintiff in a Title VII sexual harassment hostile work environment case must
satisfy two tests – the subjective (whether the victim experienced the
environment as hostile or abusive) and the objective (whether a reasonable
69
person would have found the environment to have been hostile or abusive).
However, lower courts have not adequately separated the evaluation of
evidence needed to satisfy each test. Consequently, many courts have not
addressed the facts before them in terms of two independent tests, but instead
have confused or melded what the victim experienced with what a reasonable
70
person might conclude objectively about the workplace. When courts confuse
the subjective and objective test, the conclusion that a plaintiff was not
threatened or bothered by the conduct, and therefore the conduct was not
objectively severe, leads future courts to rely on that decision to rule that similar
71
conduct could not be viewed by the reasonable person as severe.
Additionally, when Justice O’Connor in Harris declared that the Court was
taking a “middle path between making actionable any conduct that is merely
offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury,”
she may have contributed to the confusion which lower courts have
72
encountered. The problem with Justice O’Connor’s reasoning is that “merely
offensive” refers to the nature of the behavior, and presumably therefore would
be an aspect of the objective test, and “tangible psychological injury” refers to
the victim’s reaction to the conduct, and therefore would logically be part of the
73
subjective test. It is thus unclear whether finding the “middle path” entails
objectively examining the conduct of the harasser or examining the subjective
reaction of the victim. There also is uncertainty about whether and how this
search for the middle path relates to the severe or pervasive standard. Justice
65. See 510 U.S. at 21−23.
66. Id. at 23.
67. See generally 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
68. See 524 U.S. at 786−88.
69. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787.
70. See generally, Elizabeth Monroe Shaffer, Comment, Defining the “Environment” in Title VII
Hostile Work Environment Claims: Appellate Courts, Classism, and Sexual Harassment, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
695 (2002) (asserting that the objective test is sometimes used to discount the plaintiff’s subjective
reaction). See also, discussion of Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006), infra Part III.
71. See BEINER, supra note 8, at 28 (discussing how “bad precedent leads to bad precedent”);
Beiner, supra note 6, at 817−19; Johnson, supra note 6, at 114−15.
72. 510 U.S. at 21.
73. Id.
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O’Connor appears to be referring to the subjective test when discussing the
“middle path,” but her use of a spectrum that seems to involve both subjective
74
and objective factors muddled the separation of these tests. Instead, courts
should consider the claim based on whether the plaintiff can satisfy the
75
subjective test, on the one hand, and the objective test on the other.
C. Confusion in applying the totality test.
The Court in Harris affirmed its statement in Meritor that the facts in each
case must be examined based on the totality of circumstances, and declared that
this is not a mathematically precise evaluation and that no single factor is
76
required. Justice O’Connor listed factors which may be considered within the
totality test: “. . . the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
77
performance.”
The list of Harris factors created confusion in how conduct was to be
evaluated to determine whether it could be considered severe or pervasive. The
list has offered the lower courts, which have an affinity for numbered tests, with
a seemingly concrete set of standards which have achieved a prominence that
could not have been intended by Justice O’Connor. These courts have used the
factors as requirements for proving hostile work environment rather than as
considerations within a totality test. This has led to reading the severity and
78
frequency factors as requiring that the conduct be both severe and pervasive.
Other courts facially recognize the Harris factors in setting up the analysis, but
79
do not utilize them in any meaningful way. The Supreme Court stated in

74. Under the subjective test the Court in Harris seemed to be primarily interested in whether
there was some evidence that the harassment was upsetting to the plaintiff at the time it occurred and
thus affected a term or condition of the plaintiff’s employment. See id. at 21−22. The Court stated that
evidence of the plaintiff’s psychological harm is not determinative, id. at 20−22, rejecting the
requirement imposed in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986).
75. For an example of a court’s clear delineation of these tests, see, e.g., Crowley v. L.L. Bean,
Co., 303 F.3d 387, 397 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting the employer’s argument that in order to prevail on
the subjective test, the victim must have believed that the conduct met the legal definition of
unlawful sexual harassment; and ruling that the victim had presented sufficient evidence for the jury
to conclude that she did satisfy the subjective test because she perceived the perpetrator’s conduct as
hostile and abusive and the jury reasonably credited plaintiff’s testimony that she was frightened,
feared for her safety, was shaking, breaking down and upset, and felt as though she was going to be
hurt).
76. 510 U.S. at 23.
77. Id.
78. See generally Heather L. Kleinschmidt, Note, Reconsidering Severe or Pervasive: Aligning the
Standard in Sexual Harassment and Racial Harassment Causes of Action, 80 IND. L. J. 1119 (2005) (noting
that the Seventh Circuit seems to apply a severe and pervasive standard).
79. See, e.g., BEINER supra note 8, at 26 (noting that courts conclude that conduct was not
sufficiently severe or pervasive without considering the totality of circumstances, engaging in a
“divide and conquer approach” to the facts); Vivien Toomey Montz, Shifting Parameters: An
Examination of Recent Changes in the Baseline of Actionable Conduct for Hostile Working Environment
Sexual Harassment., 3 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 809, 842 (2002) (stating that when courts “disaggregate”
conduct it “robs the incidents of their cumulative effect and nullifies both the pattern and harassing
nature of the conduct.”).

HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT

259

Meritor, and reiterated in Harris and in each subsequent case, that conduct need
80
only be severe or pervasive.
The misapplication of the Harris factors has allowed courts to ignore the
more nuanced standards which emerge from the Supreme Court cases and from
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Harris. Synthesizing the Harris factors with the
rest of the analysis in that case, and with the discussions and rulings in the other
Supreme Court cases, would result in a more sensible analytical standard.
Although the Harris factors could be explicitly referred to as a broad explanation
of relevant considerations, each one needs to be placed within the analysis of
whether conduct could be considered severe or pervasive.
The “frequency of the discriminatory conduct” should logically be
considered as one of the factors in the determination of whether conduct could
81
be considered pervasive.
However, frequency is not the only relevant
consideration for the pervasive standard. Courts look at the cumulative effect
and pattern of the conduct, the setting and whether the conduct is easily
escaped, the number of co-workers participating in the conduct, and the
82
duration of the behavior.
All of these considerations aid a fact-finder in
determining whether the conduct “permeate[s] [the environment] with
83
‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’”
The inclusion of “severity” as one of the factors in the totality test offered
no guidance, since the totality test is imposed to determine whether the conduct
84
was severe (or pervasive). Further describing the totality test, Justice O’Connor
considered “whether [the conduct was] physically threatening or humiliating, or
85
a mere offensive utterance[.]” This suggests a method for determining if the
conduct was severe. She further proposed examining “. . . whether [the
86
conduct] unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”
However, this appears to relate both to the subjective and objective tests, since
interference with work performance is one of the indicators that the plaintiff was
subjectively harmed, and can also be an indicator of whether a reasonable
person could find that the conduct was severe enough to create a hostile work
87
environment. As described below in Part IV, we offer a useful framework for
understanding the Harris factors that is consistent with the intention of those
factors and provides a rational approach to determining whether conduct was
severe on the one hand, or pervasive on the other.

80. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 6, at 117−18 (extensively reviewing decisions in which courts
misapplied the Harris factors by requiring satisfaction of all of them). Sometimes courts do not cite to
Harris when they enumerate the Harris factors, failing to acknowledge the Supreme Court as the
source, which suggests that litigators and/or judges are not reading the Supreme Court cases. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Pape, 189 F.App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); Pomales v. Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 447
F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2006); Cowen v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 141 F.3d 751, 758 (7th Cir. 1998).
81. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
82. See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 6, at 327−32 (discussing various approaches to the pervasive
standard in response to its being “vague and manipulable”).
83. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65).
84. See id.
85. Id. at 23.
86. Id.
87. See DISCUSSION, supra Part IIB.
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D. Imposition of original standards.
Some courts have ignored the Supreme Court language and reasoning in
88
favor of an entirely different and original analysis. A leading example which
has had substantial impact beyond the Seventh Circuit is Baskerville v. Culligan
89
International Co
In Baskerville, Judge Posner reversed a jury verdict for the
plaintiff, declaring that “[t]he concept of sexual harassment is designed to
protect working women from the kind of male attentions that can make the
90
workplace hellish for women.” The court held that this was not a “hellish”
91
work environment. Judge Posner also stated: “It is no doubt distasteful to a
sensitive woman to have such a silly man as one’s boss, but only a woman of
Victorian delicacy – a woman mysteriously aloof from contemporary American
popular culture in all its sex-saturated vulgarity . . .” would find the conduct
92
offensive. He stated this even though the jury apparently shared the plaintiff’s
sensibilities.
At no time has the Supreme Court articulated a requirement that the
workplace must be “hellish.” In fact, most of the Court’s explanation of what
constitutes severe conduct has focused on the opposite end of the spectrum,
stating that actionable conduct was somewhere beyond “ordinary socializing”
93
and “flirtation.”
Justice O’Connor stated in Harris that to be actionable,
94
conduct did not have to be as reprehensible as the conduct in Meritor. Judge
Posner’s requirement that the workplace be “hellish” set the threshold for
determining whether conduct is actionable higher than was intended by the
Supreme Court. This has influenced other courts to set the bar too high. Judge
Posner correctly stated in the opinion that Title VII “. . .is not designed to purge
95
the workplace of vulgarity.”
However, imposing the requirement that a
workplace be “hellish” is an excessive response to the concern that Title VII
96
should not be imposed as a civility code.

88. See, e.g., cases, infra Part III.
89. 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (conduct included among other acts, the plaintiff’s boss
making grunting sounds to the plaintiff when she wore a leather skirt; announcing on the PA system
that “all pretty girls run around naked;” making a hand gesture intended to suggest masturbation;
and telling the plaintiff that he had better clean up his act and he should think of her as “Miss Anita
Hill”).
90. 50 F.3d at 430. Judge Posner cites no authority for this proposition. See Cheryl L. Anderson,
“Thinking Within the Box”: How Proof Models Are Used to Limit the Scope of Sexual Harassment Law, 19
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 125, 145−48 (2001) (describing the Baskerville characterization as a
“yardstick” by which subsequent hostile work environment clams were measured in that Circuit).
In addition, a WestLaw Keycite of the headnote in which Judge Posner stated that Title VII was
designed to protect women from the kind of male attentions that make a workplace “hellish”
produced over 255 citing cases, the overwhelming majority of which cited this favorably. (August 3,
2007).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 431.
93. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
94. 510 U.S. at 22. See Meritor, supra note 29.
95. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430.
96. See also, Montz, supra note 79, at 841 (discussing Shepherd v. The Comptroller of Public
Accountants of Texas, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 1999), which stated that “Title VII was only meant
to bar conduct that is so severe and pervasive that it destroys a protected class member’s opportunity
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PART III
In the following cases, the courts disposed of plaintiff’s Title VII claims of
hostile work environment sexual harassment by reversing a jury verdict for the
97
plaintiff or by granting summary judgment for the defendant. We discuss how
the court’s treatment of the facts in each case demonstrates some or all of the
errors we described in Part II, resulting in decisions which are contrary to what
a reasonable fact-finder could have determined. We then apply a more rational
analysis based on the Supreme Court’s explanation of the severe or pervasive
standard, to describe how an appropriate outcome could have been reached.
A. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006)
A female Deputy Sheriff, Donya Mitchell, alleged that in the County
Sheriff’s Department where she worked she was sexually harassed by another
98
officer, Major Michael Overbey, in violation of Title VII. The district court
99
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s decision, stating the conduct was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to be actionable.
Ms. Mitchell described sixteen incidents of harassment that occurred from
100
1999 to 2002.
One incident involved Mr. Overbey telling Ms. Mitchell that
101
“you can just walk into the room and I get an erection.”
He also called the
plaintiff a “frigid bitch” on two occasions: once when he tried to kiss her after a
Sheriff’s department Christmas party and another time when she refused to join
102
him in a hot tub at a hotel where they were attending a conference.
On a
separate occasion, he told her that “her ass sure does look fine” and suggested
103
she wear certain jeans.
Mr. Overbey chased plaintiff around the office, and
104
also appeared several times in her driveway during one month. One of those
105
times he was drunk and told Ms Mitchell’s son that he loved the plaintiff. He
touched or attempted to touch her three times: he attempted to kiss her; he
rubbed up against and reached across her chest; and, he lifted her over his
106
head. On some occasions he directed sexualized comments to Ms. Mitchell and
to succeed in the workplace.” The author points out that this standard is far harsher than the
Supreme Court’s requirements.)
97. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F.App’x 911 (11th Cir. 2006); Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 459 F.
Supp. 2d 415 (M.D.N.C. 2006); Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002); See also,
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 214 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (failing to properly evaluate the conduct,
which included what the court described as an “assault” or “attack” by an employee who fondled
the plaintiff’s stomach and bare breast, but also confusing the severe or pervasive standard with the
separate consideration of employer liability); see supra note 5 for articles discussing examples of
additional cases.
98. 189 F.App’x at 913.
99. The defendants were the Sheriff, Major Overbey, and the Sheriff’s Department.
100. Id. at 913, n. 3 (describing the sixteen incidents only in a footnote in the opinion).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 189 F.App’x at 913, n.3.
106. Id.
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One such incident occurred at a golf tournament where Ms.
other officers.
108
Mitchell was working a security detail. Mr. Overbey told a group of officers,
including the plaintiff, that at another golf tournament strippers were the
caddies and the strippers were directed “. . .to place golf balls into their vaginas
109
and to squirt them onto the green.”
In rejecting Ms. Mitchell’s hostile work environment claim, the Eleventh
Circuit misconstrued the Harris totality test and ignored or misapplied the
synthesis of the reasoning in the Supreme Court cases in reaching the decision
that a jury could not reasonably find that Ms. Mitchell was the victim of severe
110
or pervasive sexual harassment.
Without citing the Harris case, the court
imposed a four-part analysis based on the Harris factors: frequency; severity;
physically threatening and humiliating or mere offensive utterance; and
111
unreasonable interference with job performance. The court appeared to treat
these factors as prongs of a test, each needing to be satisfied separately, rather
than as factors within a totality test. The court stated that sixteen incidents in
four years was not frequent enough. The court later stated “. . .that this
behavior –given its relative infrequency- is not the kind of ‘severe’ harassment
112
necessary for liability to attach under Title VII.”
Here, the court used
frequency as a threshold test that must be satisfied when determining whether
the conduct is severe, rather than discussing the pervasive standard
independently and providing an explanation of why sixteen incidents did not
113
contribute to a finding of pervasive harassment.
The court went on to explain that there were only three incidents of
physical conduct and that Ms. Mitchell did not assert that she felt threatened by
114
the physical conduct. The court seemed to confuse the subjective test with the
objective test. The victim’s reaction to the conduct is a separate inquiry from
115
whether a reasonable person would have found the conduct threatening.
There may have been grounds to find that the subjective test was not met in this
case and therefore that there was no violation of Title VII, but the court never
addressed the subjective test separately to determine whether the plaintiff found
the circumstances intolerable and unreasonably interfered with her job
116
performance.
If the court had concluded that Ms. Mitchell did not feel
threatened or humiliated by Mr. Overbey’s actions and did not complain to
supervisors in a timely manner, then the court should have determined that the

107. Id.
108. Mitchell, 189 F.App’x at 913.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 912.
111. Id. at 913.
112. Id. at 913–14.
113. See DISCUSSION, supra Part II C. that the test should be applied as the Court intended, in the
alternative: severe or pervasive.
114. 189 F.App’x at 913.
115. See DISCUSSION, supra Part II B. that the objective and subjective tests should be applied
independently, also as the Court intended.
116. Id. at 914 (concluding that health problems on the part of plaintiff were the greatest
hindrance to her job performance and led to the confrontation with the sheriff and ultimately to her
resignation).
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117

subjective test was not satisfied. The court’s conclusion that the plaintiff did
not feel threatened by the conduct, and therefore that the conduct was not
severe, gives future courts the opportunity to rely on these facts as an example
of the type of harassment that should not be viewed as objectively hostile even in
cases where the plaintiff clearly satisfies the subjective test.
In its brief discussion of the nature of the conduct, the court stated that the
conduct was “reprehensible” and “crass and juvenile,” but also stated that much
118
of the conduct was “horseplay.” Not only did the court fail to identify which
incidents should be classified as “horseplay,” but it also did not state what
119
constitutes “horseplay”.
“Horseplay” was used by the Supreme Court in
120
Oncale to describe conduct that would not be actionable. The term the Court
used, however, was “male on male horseplay,” which in the context of the
Oncale case, was relevant because it was a same-sex harassment case and the
121
egregious conduct in that case was not considered horseplay.
Even if
“horseplay” were applied to male-female interactions, the only behavior that
conceivably might be considered horseplay was Mr. Overbey’s turning the
122
bathroom lights on and off. However, this incident would have to be viewed
in isolation from all the other highly sexualized conduct to simply dismiss this
incident as “horseplay.”
The court offered no meaningful case comparisons to support its
conclusion that the conduct was not actionable. The court never discussed what
conduct would be considered severe. It compared, without explanation, this
case to two Eleventh Circuit cases in which the court concluded that the conduct
123
was not objectively severe or pervasive. However, in Mendoza, there were no
sexually explicit comments and most of the conduct consisted of plaintiff feeling
as though she was being stared at by her co-worker when he looked at her groin
124
area and made sniffing sounds.
The conduct in the Mitchell case was more
125
126
sexually explicit than in Mendoza.
The Mitchell court also cited to Gupta,

117. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22 (stating that “if the victim does not subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim’s
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.”) The court also could have made an independent
conclusion regarding employer liability as the basis for its disposition.
118. 189 F.App’x at 913.
119. Id.
120. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
121. The plaintiff in Oncale was subjected to forcible sex-related, humiliating actions on multiple
occasions, sexual physical assault, and a threat of rape. See 523 U.S. at 77. The Court declined to
detail the incidents in the interest of “both brevity and dignity.” Id.
The Court’s characterization of “male on male horseplay” suggests that this is not a category best
used to describe male-female interactions in the workplace, and that the terms the Supreme Court
used in the same section of Oncale, “intersexual flirtation” and “ordinary socializing,” are better
suited for describing the types of male–female interactions that are not actionable. See id. at 81.
122. 189 F.App’x at 913.
123. Id. at 914; Mendoza v. Borden, 195 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir. 1999).
124. See 195 F.3d at 1243 (addressing the cumulative effect and the totality test in determining
that the conduct was very mild). In Mitchell, the court seemed to ignore the totality test and isolated
the incidents.
125. The conduct in Mendoza perhaps also could have been found to have violated Title VII
under the test the authors apply here.
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which involved no explicit or crude sexual comments or actions; rather, the
conduct consisted of persistent uncomfortable attention by a male co-worker
127
toward the plaintiff. Leaving aside whether Gupta or Mendoza were properly
decided, neither of these cases which were relied on by the court contain the
overt sexual comments and unambiguous sexual behavior that occurred here.
The Supreme Court in Oncale stated that intersexual flirtation and ordinary
128
socializing do not create discriminatory conditions in the workplace. A male
coworker telling a female coworker that she gives him an erection could be
found by a reasonable person to go beyond ordinary socializing and intersexual
flirtation. This comment when viewed in the context of the other humiliating
incidents shows a workplace permeated with sexually offensive conduct rather
that an example of innocuous differences in the way men and women routinely
interact. Had the court considered the cumulative effect of the sixteen incidents,
the court may have had more difficulty concluding the conduct was not
129
objectively severe or pervasive. These were not isolated offensive utterances,
but a pattern of explicit verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature. These
were not examples of the ordinary tribulations of the workplace.
B. Moser v. MCC Outdoor, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 415 (M.D.N.C. 2006)
Plaintiff
Moser was a Sales Representative for a company that sold
130
Throughout her twelve months of employment,
outdoor advertising spaces.
Ms. Moser was repeatedly harassed by Eddie Jones, her sales manager, and by
three other male sales representatives: George Wilkes, Kelly Phipps, and Tom
131
The court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and, in its
Poe.
opinion, divided the conduct into touching incidents, statements, and various
132
other acts toward the plaintiff. When the court applied the severe or pervasive
standard to the facts, ruling that the allegations were not sufficiently frequent or
serious, it summarized the numerous incidents as follows:
Plaintiff experienced mild touching like . . . attempted kisses and touches,
including Wilkes’s popping [her buttocks] with a plastic water bottle, fellow
employees twice trying to lift, or engaging in conduct that might lead to a lifting
of, Plaintiff’s skirt, and Jones’s infrequent side hugs during the year-long
133
employment, leg touches on one car trip, or kisses at a local restaurant.

Within this recitation of facts, the court failed to mention that the plaintiff had
134
The court only
thwarted an attempt by Phipps to touch her breasts.
mentioned this incident at the beginning of the case and not when analyzing the

126. Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571 (11th Cir. 2000).
127. 109 F.App’x at 914.
128. 523 U.S. at 81.
129. See Mitchell, 189 F.App’x at 913–14.
130. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 418–19.
133. Id. at 421.
134. Id. at 418.
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its summary of the harassment:

135

265

The court continued

Additionally, . . . Plaintiff experienced mild and infrequent verbal abuse. For
example, Wilkes once told Plaintiff to slow down in her stride because she was
bouncing, commented that he could see Plaintiff’s underwear, called Plaintiff a
“dingbat” and “dumb blonde,” and told her he knew she would have an affair
with someone in the office. Phipps once told Plaintiff that he wished to have
sexual intercourse with her, and Poe once stated that he would consider having
sexual intercourse with Plaintiff. Poe also once asked Plaintiff if she were
wearing a thong and shared personal information about his love life. Poe
stopped describing acts with his wife after Plaintiff told him to stop several
times. . . . Jones stated he loved Plaintiff, stated he wished to have sexual
intercourse with Plaintiff, suggested Plaintiff was familiar with directions to his
house because of her frequent visits there, said he would “do her,” and
suggested it was a good thing she worked out because she did not have sexual
intercourse as an outlet for her energy. Jones also stated his desire to engage in
sexual intercourse with women, commented on women’s breasts and buttocks,
told Plaintiff he favored small breasts, and commented to another employee, in
Plaintiff’s presence, that they should ask Plaintiff about various sexual
136
techniques.
Plaintiff witnessed or experienced several acts of similar frequency and severity.
A fellow employee took a picture of Plaintiff’s behind without Plaintiff’s prior
knowledge. Jones showed Plaintiff a picture of a little boy with a large phallus
137
superimposed upon him saying that this was he when he was young.

The court also noted that the plaintiff’s conduct at the company was not “model
138
either.”
Fellow employees complained about plaintiff’s loud and abrasive
139
tone.
Plaintiff had nicknames for the fellow employees, such as “baldy,”
140
“chubby” and “Lucifer.”
The court explained that the plaintiff had complained about some of the
conduct to her General Manager who, after attempting once to mediate the
141
problem, threatened to fire the plaintiff and one of the harassers. Eventually
142
Ms. Moser was fired after loudly arguing with another employee.
Plaintiff
143
then filed her lawsuit claiming violations of Title VII.
The court determined that the conduct was “not sufficiently frequent and
144
serious.” It described the Harris factors and then stated that the totality of facts
135. Id.
136. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
137. Id. at 421-22.
138. Id. at 419.
139. Id.
140. Id. This description of plaintiff’s behavior would only be relevant in an evaluation of the
subjective test, and concluding that she was abrasive, loud, and gave some employees nonsexualized nicknames was improper as further justification for denying plaintiff relief within the
objective test.
141. Id.
142. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 419.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 421.
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must show more than unpleasantness, cruelness, or vulgarity, citing a 1997
146
Fourth Circuit case, Hartsell v. Cuplex Prods. Inc.
The court then relied on
147
148
Baskerville for the proposition that the workplace must be “hellish”. Even in
2006, the Moser court relied on the Baskerville “hellish” standard from 1995 and a
Fourth Circuit case from 1997, failing to follow the Supreme Court guidance on
149
what is severe or pervasive.
Evaluating the explicit conduct in Moser, the court relied primarily on a
150
comparison to the conduct in Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, decided
151
by the Seventh Circuit in 1993.
The court tried to show similarities to the
Moser facts in order to conclude that the harassment in Moser did not reach an
152
153
actionable level. The court in Weiss summarized its facts as follows:
Weiss describes a number of incidents of employment-related sexual
harassment. By her second week, Lawrence, who was warehouse manager and
one of Weiss’ supervisors, began asking Weiss about her personal life and
complimenting her, telling her how beautiful she was. By her fourth week,
Lawrence began asking her for dates. Weiss told Lawrence that she would not
have a sexual or dating relationship with a co-worker. Lawrence said he
understood and went on about his business. Several weeks later, however,
Lawrence asked Weiss to a wedding. Weiss also complains that Lawrence
would jokingly call her a “dumb blond” when errors in her inventory counts
would come out. She treated these statements as jokes, but stated that it
bothered her when he called her that in front of other employees.
When Weiss had difficulties with a month-end inventory, she called Lawrence
at home for assistance. Lawrence then called later from a bar to check on how
the inventory was proceeding. He invited her to come to the bar when she was
finished. Weiss went there with a friend and another co-worker. Lawrence
bought them a drink, discussed their inventory problem, and they played darts.
Lawrence later put his arm around Weiss’ chair and tried to kiss her, but she
pulled back, said she was leaving and went home. The next week, Lawrence
placed “I love you” signs in Weiss’ work area. Weiss threatened to report it to
their supervisors if it ever happened again, but it did not. Weiss testified that
Lawrence put his hand on her shoulder at least six times during her
employment. On one occasion she objected, and he took his hand off of her
shoulder. Finally, after having testified that Lawrence avoided her in June,
Weiss later stated that Lawrence had approached her twice in the front office at

145. Id.
146. 123 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 1997).
147. Bakersville, supra note 89; see DISCUSSION, supra Part II D.
148. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
149. In a subsequent Title VII sexual harassment case, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have
reached a reasonable conclusion that summary judgment for defendant was inappropriate, in light
of plaintiff’s having advanced evidence which would support satisfaction of both the subjective and
objective tests. However, it applied the Harris factors as prongs of a test, even as it cautioned against
fixating on any single factor. See Meyers v. Cent. Fla. Investments, Inc., 2007 WL 1667212. at 3 (11th
Cir. 2007).
150. 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993).
151. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
152. Id. at 421—22.
153. 990 F.2d at 334—35.
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Coca-Cola and tried to kiss her. She responded by pulling away and asking him
to leave her alone.

Leaving aside the issue of whether Weiss was correctly decided, it is hard to
conceive that these two cases would be seen as similar. There was no conduct in
Weiss that was as explicitly sexual as in Moser: there was no attempt to grab her
breasts; the plaintiff’s co-worker never explicitly stated that he was interested in
having sexual intercourse; there were no comments about the plaintiff’s and
others’ body parts and/or inquiries into the plaintiff’s and other’s sex lives. All
154
of these were present in Moser.
Although the court acknowledged that the
conduct in Moser “was over a longer span and included more instances” than in
Weiss, it nevertheless concluded that “neither case presented a hellish
155
environment akin to daily vulgar and offensive acts.”
The court implicitly
supported its decision by considering the conduct as “isolated incidents of
156
minor seriousness.”
When three of the four male co-workers whom plaintiff accused of
harassment in Moser explicitly expressed their interest in having sexual
intercourse with her, this reasonably could be interpreted as more than mere
157
intersexual flirtation and ordinary socializing.
Indeed, this is precisely the
kind of conduct identified by Meritor and the subsequent Supreme Court cases
158
as possible examples of severe conduct. Moreover, the plaintiff here endured
159
this offensive conduct regularly for twelve months, and the court failed to
address the pattern and frequency of this behavior, its cumulative effect, or the
likelihood of repetition or inescapability. The court thereby failed to evaluate
the potential for a reasonable conclusion that the behavior was pervasive. It
160
merely drew a parenthetical comparison to Smith v. First Union National
161
Bank, where the plaintiff endured a barrage of harassment over thirty times
during the first few weeks of her employment - clearly an extreme situation and
an outlier case improperly relied on to define a threshold for considering
conduct pervasive.
C. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002)
In August 1994, through an arrangement with the Junior College District of
St. Louis, Diana Duncan began work as a technical training clerk providing in162
house support at a General Motors Corporation (GMC) manufacturing facility.
Throughout her tenure, from 1994-1997, Ms. Duncan was subjected to

154. 459 F. Supp.2d at 418–19.
155. Id. at 422.
156. Id. at 421.
157. See 523 U.S. at 81.
158. See DISCUSSION, supra Part I, noting the Court’s reliance on the EEOC Guidelines, 29 CFR §
1604.11(a)(1985); these Guidelines enumerated types of workplace conduct which might be
actionable: “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature.”
159. Moser, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 418.
160. Id. at 422.
161. 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000).
162. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 931.
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unwelcome attention by a GMC employee which culminated in her
163
resignation.
Two weeks after she began working at GMC, this employee requested an
off-site meeting with her at a restaurant and propositioned her, requesting a
164
relationship.
Ms. Duncan rebuffed him and left the restaurant; he later
165
apologized for his behavior and made no further propositions. However, Ms.
Duncan stated that thereafter his behavior towards her became hostile and he
166
was more critical of her work. She also testified about numerous incidents of
inappropriate behavior: the employee asked Ms. Duncan to use his computer to
create a training document, and had a picture of a naked woman on his screensaver; on four or five occasions, he unnecessarily touched her hand when she
gave him the telephone; in 1995, in response to a request for a pay raise and
consideration for an illustrator’s position (even though other applicants for the
position had been required to draw automotive parts), he required her to draw a
planter he kept in his office which was shaped like a slouched man wearing a
sombrero, with a hole in the front of the man’s pants that allowed a cactus to
167
protrude; also in 1995, he and a college employee posted on a bulletin board in
the high-tech area a “recruitment” poster portraying Ms. Duncan as the
168
president and CEO of the Man Hater’s Club of America; in April, 1996, he and
a college employee arranged to have Ms. Duncan “arrested” at the company as
part of a charity event, but once the employee paid for her “release,” and despite
her protestations, the employee took Ms. Duncan to a bar; and, in May, 1997, he
asked Ms. Duncan to type a draft of the beliefs of the “He-Men Women Hater’s
169
170
Club,” but she refused and resigned two days later.
A jury found for Ms. Duncan on her claims of sexual harassment and
171
172
constructive discharge.
The Eighth Circuit reversed.
The court cited the
Harris factors, but failed to apply them or synthesize them with the guidance
173
from the other Supreme Court cases to meaningfully evaluate the conduct.

163. Id. at 930.
164. Id. at 931.
165. Id.
166. Id. Ms. Duncan admitted that the employee often directed criticisms at others as well,
including her male co-workers.
167. Id. at 932. Ms. Duncan later learned that she was not qualified for the position because she
did not have a college degree.
168. Id. (summarizing evidence that the poster listed the membership qualifications as: “Must
always be in control of: (1) Checking, Savings, all loose change, etc.; (2) (Ugh) Sex; (3) Raising
children our way!; (4) Men must always do household chores; (5) Consider T.V. Dinners a gourmet
meal”).
169. Id. Plaintiff was asked to type the beliefs of this club, quoted by the court as including:
“Constitutional Amendment, the 19th, giving women [the] right to vote should be repealed. Real HeMen indulge in a lifestyle of cursing, using tools, handling guns, driving trucks, hunting and of
course, drinking beer. Women really do have coodies [sic] and they can spread. Women [are] the
cause of 99.9 per cent of stress in men. Sperm has a right to live. All great chiefs of the world are
men. Prostitution should be legalized.”
170. Id.
171. Id. at 933.
172. Id. at 931.
173. Id. at 934.
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The court stated that “Title VII is ‘not designed to purge the workplace of
174
vulgarity,’” quoting from Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co, a Seventh Circuit case,
but Baskerville was decided before Oncale and Faragher, and those cases do not
make as sweeping a statement about the purpose of Title VII. Rather, the
Supreme Court cautioned that Title VII is not to be imposed as a general civility
175
code, which is narrower than the characterization in Baskerville.
Earlier in the opinion, the court had stated that the conduct was not so
severe or pervasive as to alter a term, condition, or privilege of the plaintiff’s
employment; “[t]o clear the high threshold of actionable harm” plaintiff had to
show that the workplace was permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
176
ridicule, and insult,” citing Harris.
In order to explain this conclusion, the
court attempted to compare these facts to those in other cases, primarily from
177
other circuits.
However, it did so by merely stating that “[n]umerous cases
have rejected hostile work environment claims premised upon facts equally or
178
more egregious than the conduct at issue here.”
The court concluded its discussion by imposing standards of its own, with
179
no citation or reference to any Supreme Court or other court language.
It
stated that the employee’s actions were “boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly
immature,” but did not create an objectively hostile work environment
180
permeated with sexual harassment.
The court selectively related “four
categories” of conduct presented by plaintiff’s evidence, omitting, without
explanation, the charity arrest incident and the evidence of hostility and
181
criticism following the rebuffed request for a relationship.
The court then
dismissively characterized the other incidents as: “a single request for a
relationship, which was not repeated when she rebuffed it, four or five isolated
incidents of [the employee] briefly touching her hand, a request to draw a
182
planter, and teasing in the form of a poster and beliefs for an imaginary club.”
The court returned to the subjective test, stating that it was apparent that
the conduct made the plaintiff uncomfortable, before concluding that the
conduct “did not meet the standard necessary for actionable sexual
183
harassment.”
The dissent skillfully identified some of these shortcomings of the majority
184
opinion’s disposition of this case.
Judge Arnold found the jury’s
determination reasonable and supported by ample evidence; throughout his
discussion he recognized appropriate inferences that the jury could have drawn

174. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934.
175. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
176. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 935.
180. Id.
181. Earlier the court stated that GMC conceded that “these ten incidents could arguably be
based on sex,” citing all but the charity event. Id. at 933−34.
182. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 936–37.
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to support its verdict, and noted, quoting circuit precedent, that because there
“‘is no bright line between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant
186
conduct, . . . a jury’s decision must generally stand unless there is trial error.”
This conduct was not ordinary socializing, reflecting genuine but
innocuous ways in which men and women routinely interact with members of
the opposite sex; the conduct, as recognized by Judge Arnold, went far beyond
187
gender related jokes and occasional teasing.
A more meaningful evaluation of the conduct to determine if the jury
properly could have considered it severe would have applied the Supreme
Court analysis. Doing so could have led to a conclusion that it was severe
because it consisted of a request for a sexual relationship, and hostility based on
sex. Judge Arnold characterized the proposition as a “sexual advance by her
supervisor within days of beginning her job,” occurring during work hours and
188
constituting a direct request for a sexual relationship. He further recognized
that in the following months, the supervisor’s conduct became hostile,
consisting of increased criticism of plaintiff’s work and degradation of her
189
professional capabilities in front of her peers. He stated that there also were
other forms of inappropriate behavior, including physical contacts; social
humiliation; emotional intimidation (citing the touching of her hand, public
humiliation, the requirement to draw a vulgar planter or not be considered for
promotion); and specific tasks of a sexual nature (such as typing the club
190
minutes).
Similarly, an application of the Supreme Court analysis to these facts
logically would have supported the conclusion that a jury properly could have
found that the conduct was pervasive. Judge Arnold stated that Ms. Duncan
191
was subjected to “a long series” of incidents of sexual harassment, and that the
sexual overture was not an isolated one, but was the beginning of a string of
192
degrading actions.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably

185. Id. at 937. Again, proper respect for a jury’s determination in these cases is a clear way to
avoid inconsistent and confusing rulings by courts of appeals.
186. Id. at 938 (additional citation omitted). He further quoted additional precedent that the
determination of whether the conduct rose to the level of abuse is largely in the hands of the jury
(citation omitted).
187. Id., quoting Faragher and Oncale.
188. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 937.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 936.
192. Judge Arnold criticized the majority as minimizing the effect of the sexual proposition on
Ms. Duncan’s working conditions by characterizing it as a “single request.” He also criticized the
majority’s faulty reliance on other circuit court cases, declaring that the behavior to which Ms.
Duncan was subjected was not “less severe” than conduct in some of the cases and he distinguished
it from conduct in some other cases. Id. at 937−38. He noted, for example, that Ms. Duncan was
given specific tasks of a sexually-charged nature; that she was subjected to conduct which would
prevent her from succeeding in the workplace; that she was sexually propositioned; and that she
was singled out – the conduct was directed specifically at her. Id. With regard to comparisons to
cases within the Eighth Circuit, Judge Arnold asked: “Is it clear that the women in these cases
suffered harassment greater than Ms. Duncan?” He answered: “I think not.” Id. at 938.
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decided that the conduct was sufficiently persistent and regular, creating a
193
cumulative effect and an expectation of repetition.
Thus, rather than applying the analytical guidance provided by the
Supreme Court for the evaluation of conduct in these cases, and rather than
properly deferring to the jury’s determination, the Eighth Circuit irrationally
reversed.
PART IV
As demonstrated in Part III, a correct understanding and application of the
Supreme Court reasoning and analysis would result in more consistent and
appropriate outcomes in lower court decisions. This would enable courts to
distinguish “ordinary socializing” from “discriminatory conditions of
194
employment.”
In this section we present the totality of circumstances test for determining
whether conduct could be considered objectively severe or pervasive, based on a
synthesis of the Supreme Court opinions. This provides both a guide for judges
195
in ruling on dispositive motions and model jury instructions.
A. General instructions regarding totality of circumstances test to determine if
conduct could be considered severe or pervasive.
Conduct which is either objectively severe or objectively pervasive, such
that it alters the conditions of employment, creates a hostile work environment
196
and violates Title VII.
Within the objective test to determine whether conduct was severe or
pervasive, examine the record as a whole and the totality of circumstances,
guided by common sense and sensitivity to social context in which the incidents
197
occurred.
Consider the surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the
198
physical acts performed.
199
No single factor is required and this is not a mathematically precise test.

193. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
194. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
195. Current model jury instructions may provide some guidance but fall into the same trap as
the cases in terms of over-reliance on the Harris factors and/or misstatement of the law, including
meshing of the subjective and objective tests. See, e.g., 3C Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 171.40 (5th Ed.),
196. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78; Faragher, 524 U.S. at
787; Clark, 536 U.S. at 270.
197. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. This does not mandate different analyses depending on whether the
conduct occurs in a blue or white collar environment. See generally Shaffer, supra note 70
(appropriately criticizing such a two-standard approach).
198. Id. at 81–82.
199. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
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B. Whether conduct could be considered severe.
The nature of all the conduct should be analyzed to determine whether it
contributed to an environment which reasonably could be considered hostile or
200
abusive.
Most commonly, the claim of hostile work environment involves a number
201
of acts and the claim is based on the cumulative effect of these individual acts,
although an extreme single act might be considered severe.
There is no hierarchy of behavior, such that physical acts are to be
202
considered more extreme than verbal conduct.
Conduct may be considered severe whether motivated by sexual desire
203
and/or by hostility based on gender.
204
Conduct need not be criminal to be considered severe.
Conduct may be considered severe if it was either physically threatening or
205
humiliating.
Conduct may be considered severe if it included: requests for sexual
206
relations (explicit or implicit proposals for sexual activity ); actual sexual
207
relations; fondling; pursuit; and/or unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
208
sexual favors, and other verbal and physical conduct of a sexual nature.
Conduct which is objectively regarded as ordinary socializing in the
209
workplace, such as intersexual flirtation, is not considered severe.
Conduct which objectively reflects innocuous differences in the ways men
and women routinely interact with members of the opposite sex is not
210
considered severe.
Conduct would not be considered severe if it consisted of a mere utterance
211
of an offensive epithet; and/or merely if words used have sexual content or
212
connotations.
Conduct would not be considered severe if it consisted merely of simple
213
teasing, offhand comments and [isolated] incidents (unless extremely serious).
Ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as [sporadic] use of abusive
214
are not to be
language, gender-related jokes, and [occasional] teasing
considered severe.
200. Id. at 22–23.
201. See Clark, 536 U.S. at 271, and Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
202. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82.
203. Id. at 80.
204. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
205. This is one of the Harris factors, 510 U.S. at 23.
206. See Oncale, 530 U.S. at 80.
207. See facts in Meritor, supra note 28, which the Court held were plainly sufficient to state a
claim for hostile environment sexual harassment.
208. EEOC Guidelines (1980), cited in Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
209. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
210. Id.
211. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
212. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
213. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Clark, 532 U.S. at 271.
214. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
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C. Whether conduct could be considered pervasive.
Conduct which permeated the workplace with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult is pervasive and creates a hostile work environment in
215
violation of Title VII.
216
Offensive conduct which is frequent may be considered pervasive.
Frequency may be determined by examining how many times the acts
217
occurred, as well as the regularity, repetition or pattern of the offensive
218
conduct within the duration of the victim’s employment.
It is appropriate to consider where and when conduct occurred, within
219
and/or outside the workplace, because conduct which was inescapable, or
unavoidable, and/or occurring in various locations, can contribute to a finding
220
that it was pervasive.
It also is appropriate to consider how long the conduct persisted and with
what degree of regularity or repetition, to decide if it created an expectation
221 222
and/or a cumulative effect.
223
Conduct which is merely “isolated, sporadic, or occasional,” such that it
did not permeate the workplace with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule and
insult, is not pervasive.
CONCLUSION
The reasoning provided by the Supreme Court in the sexual harassment
cases offers more guidance to lower courts than they have recognized. Instead,
federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals frequently rely on other
lower court decisions that have ignored the Supreme Court reasoning; and, to a
large extent, the lower courts have applied their own notions of acceptable
workplace behavior. This has resulted in unjust and inconsistent dispositions.
All parties in these lawsuits deserve adjudications in which the legal
standards are applied consistently, which could be achieved by more direct and

215. See Harris, 519 U.S. at 21.
216. The definition of frequent: “happening at short intervals, often repeated or occurring”,
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, www.m-w.com/dictionary/frequent (last visited Dec. 29,
2007).
217. See Schnapper, discussed supra note 82.
218. The Court noted that the offensive conduct continued for four years in Meritor, 477 U.S. at
60, and that the objectionable behavior occurred repeatedly and frequently for the part-time and
summer employees from 1985−1990 in Faragher, 524 U.S. at 780–84; See Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
219. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60–61.
220. See Schnapper, discussed supra note 82.
221. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
222. The level of offensiveness of the conduct needs to be considered when determining if the
conduct was pervasive, but the threshold may be lower than that imposed when the court is
analyzing whether the conduct was severe, as suggested by commentators discussing the inverse
analysis. See Pellicotti, supra note 12. However, the determination of whether conduct was severe or
pervasive requires independent inquiries; conduct does not have to be severe to be pervasive nor
pervasive to be severe; both inquiries require a review of the totality of circumstances. This
approach is derived from the reasoning of the Supreme Court cases and a synthesis of the Harris
factors with that reasoning.
223. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788; Clark, 532 U.S. at 271.
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explicit application of the Supreme Court’s analysis. The failure to do so has
resulted in courts’ lack of appreciation for the vast array of discriminatory and
hostile conduct that lies just beyond the genuine differences in the ways men
224
and women routinely interact with members of the opposite sex.
Repeated warnings throughout the Supreme Court cases that isolated
incidents of offensive conduct, sporadic use of gender-related jokes, or
occasional teasing does not result in Title VII liability, provide sufficient
guidance to prevent the statute from being used as a federally imposed civility
225
code.
Attempting to grab a co-workers breast; explicitly propositioning the
plaintiff for sex; forcing a plaintiff as part of her job assignment to draw a
phallus; commenting on explicit intimate parts of the plaintiff’s body; a steady
stream of sexualized comments and acts directed at the plaintiff throughout her
226
employment —such conduct should be presented to a fact-finder for a
reasonable determination of its severity or pervasiveness. The fact-finder
should apply the synthesis of the Supreme Court’s reasoning to the conduct to
determine if it violates Title VII, and appellate courts should exercise restraint in
respecting the fact-finders’ determinations. Such a process is necessary as these
cases are fact intensive, and require an evaluation of the totality of
227
circumstances and the cumulative effect of individual acts. Proper application
of the Supreme Court’s analysis would ensure that courts uphold “Title VII’s
228
broad rule of workplace equality.”

224. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
225. See id.; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788.
226. See facts in cases discussed in Part III.
227. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115.
228. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.

